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Abstract
This paper examines the response of husbands’ and wives’ earnings to a tax reform in which
husbands’ and wives’ tax rates changed independently, allowing me to examine the effect of both
spouses’ incentives on each spouse’s behavior. I compare the results to those of more simplified
econometric models that are used in the typical setting in which such independent variation is not
available. Using administrative panel data on approximately 11% of the married Swedish popu-
lation, I analyze the impact of the large Swedish tax reform of 1990-1. I find that in response
to a compensated rise in one spouse’s tax rate, that spouse’s earned income rises, and the other
spouse’s earned income also rises. I test and reject a set of models in which the family maximizes
a single utility function. A standard econometric specification, in which one spouse reacts to the
other spouse’s income as if it were unearned income, yields biased coefficient estimates. Uncom-
pensated elasticities of earned income with respect to the fraction of income kept after taxes are
over-estimated by a factor of more than three, and income effects are of the wrong sign. A sec-
ond common specification, in which overall family income is related to the family’s tax rate and
income, also yields substantially over-estimated own compensated and uncompensated elasticities.
Standard econometric specifications may substantially mis-estimate earnings responses to taxation.
1Email: agelber@nber.org. I am especially grateful to Lawrence Katz, David Cutler, Martin Feldstein, Caroline
Hoxby, Richard Freeman, and Hanley Chiang, as well as to others too numerous to name individually. Per-Anders
Edin deserves special thanks for his generosity in helping to obtain data. I thank Håkan Björk, Hans Grönquist,
Håkan Selin, and Marcus Vingren for graciously answering questions regarding the data. An earlier draft of this
paper circulated under the title "Taxation and Family Labor Supply." NBER, the Uppsala Center for Fiscal Studies,
Uppsala University, IFAU, and NIA Grant Number T32-AG00186 provided generous financial support. Part of this
paper was completed while visiting at Uppsala University for a project with Per-Anders Edin. All errors are my
own.
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I. Introduction
Standard investigations of the impact of taxation on taxable income income typically relate the
sum of the family’s taxable income to a measure of the family’s tax rate.2 In a parallel literature
on the effect of tax rates on labor supply, it is standard to relate a spouse’s labor supply decision
to his or her own tax rate (e.g. Hausman 1981; Eissa 1995; Blundell, Duncan, and Meghir 1998).
It has been typical to assume that an individual’s labor supply responds to the income of his or her
spouse as it would respond to unearned income, following a long tradition beginning with Mincer
(1962). In this paper, I relax these restrictions by examining how independent variation in both
spouses’ tax rates impacts each spouse’s earnings decision. A richer econometric model allowing
for such independent variation shows that the simplifications inherent in the standard approaches
may lead to strongly biased results.
Swedish tax reforms in the early 1990s represent a particularly promising setting for studying
these issues, for three primary reasons. First, Sweden has individual taxation, meaning that an
individual’s marginal tax rate on earned income depends only on his or her own income. When the
Swedish tax schedule changes, husbands and wives face different changes in their marginal tax rates,
and the relative size of these changes differs across households, allowing me to identify the response
of one spouse’s income to the other spouse’s incentives.3 In the U.S., by contrast, married couples
are almost always taxed jointly on the sum of their incomes, implying that husbands and wives face
the same marginal tax rate. Second, I use the Longitudinal Individual Data for Sweden (LINDA),
which contain information on the separate income of each spouse, unlike the IRS-Michigan-NBER
Tax Panel on the U.S., which measures married couples’ taxable income at the family level and
does not allow investigation of how each spouse’s income responds to incentives. The LINDA
data are a panel of detailed administrative data on the labor force activity, government program
participation, demographic characteristics, and other relevant features of approximately 11% of the
Swedish population, which allows me to estimate parameters precisely, including cross responses.
Third, from 1989 to 1991, the top marginal income tax rate in Sweden decreased from 76% to
51%, with substantial but smaller decreases in other tax brackets. This represents an opportunity
to examine labor supply responses to large exogenous changes in incentives.4
With a specification allowing for cross responses, I estimate a rich set of parameters, including
own and cross income and substitution effects for both husbands and wives. Standard econometric
models, in which one’s own income or hours worked is assumed to respond to spousal income as it
responds to unearned income, cannot reflect the possibility that the spouse’s tax rate could have
both income and substitution effects on one’s earnings. The literature examining the response
of families’ taxable income to the marginal tax rates they face leaves open the question of how
2This large literature includes Feldstein (1995), Gruber and Saez (2002), Kopczuk (2005), Auten and Carroll
(1999), Goolsbee (1999), and Saez (2003). See Slemrod, Saez, and Giertz (2009) for a review.
3I use “own response,” “own elasticity,” or “own effect” to refer to the reaction to one’s own wage, tax rate, or
income, and “cross response,” “cross elasticity,” or “cross effect” to refer to the reaction to the wage, tax rate, or
income of one’s spouse.
4Chetty (2010) argues that large reforms give much more precise parameter estimates, and Chetty, Friedman,
Pistaferri, and Olsen (2010) argue that large reforms may give estimates closer to long-run labor supply elasticities.
Indeed, Chetty (2010) argues that because my paper examines a large reform in Sweden, I perform much more
precise parameter estimates than other papers on income responses to taxation.
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husbands’ and wives’ decisions separately contribute to families’ aggregate responses, and implicitly
assumes that the family can be treated as if it had one virtual income.
The results show that husbands and wives react to each other’s marginal tax rates and un-
earned incomes, as well as to their own. My central estimates show compensated elasticities of
individuals’ earned income with respect to their own net-of-tax share of .25 and .49 for husbands
and wives, respectively.5 (The net-of-tax share is defined as one minus the marginal tax rate.)
It is noteworthy that the female earned income elasticity is higher than the elasticity for men,
even in a country known for its relative gender equality and high female labor force participation
rate. Compensated cross elasticities are .048 and .051, respectively, implying that in response to
a compensated decrease in one spouse’s tax rate, both spouses’ earned incomes rise. Elasticities
of earned income with respect to own unearned income are large (-.074 and -.056 for husbands
and wives, respectively) and precisely estimated. I estimate elasticities of own earned income with
respect to spouses’ unearned income of -.0041 for husbands and -.018 for wives. When the depen-
dent variable is a measure of taxable labor income, calculated by subtracting tax deductions from
labor income, the elasticities are similar.
I find that standard econometric models, which make various simplifications, may yield very
different results. I first assume that one spouse’s earned income responds to the other spouse’s
income as it reacts to unearned income. This yields an estimate of the income effect that is large
and of the wrong sign. When a husband’s marginal tax rate falls, he works more, and the estimates
imply that his wife works more, as well. This induces a spurious positive correlation between the
change in the measure of the husband’s unearned income (which includes his wife’s income) and the
change in the husband’s own earnings. Thus, the estimated coefficient on the husband’s unearned
income, which represents the income effect on his earnings, is overly positive.6 For both husbands
and wives, this specification also produces an estimate of the uncompensated earnings elasticity
that is biased upward by a factor of more than three, as well as an over-estimate of the compensated
elasticity. A standard assumption from the parallel literature on the elasticity of taxable income is
that the family’s overall earnings reacts to the net-of-tax share and overall family unearned income.
This specification likewise produces divergent results, with the compensated and uncompensated
own elasticity substantially over-estimated and the uncompensated cross elasticity substantially
under-estimated. Other specifications frequently run in the literature, including specifications
omitting unearned income, also produce substantially biased results. Because these lessons are
methodological—reflecting whether standard approaches produce correct results—I argue that the
results are relevant to our understanding of these methods in contexts both inside and outside
Sweden.
Since I estimate own and cross uncompensated and compensated effects, I am able to perform
two separate tests of a unitary model of family taxpaying decisions. The unitary model is defined
by the feature that the family can be characterized as maximizing a single utility function. I
reject a unitary model based on violations of the "income pooling condition," which implies in this
context that a married individual’s pre-tax earnings should react equally to an increase in that
5Chetty (2009) discusses why examining the response of earned income is a promising alternative to examining
taxable income.
6Analogous reasoning implies that the estimated coefficient on the wife’s unearned income should be overly
positive.
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individual’s unearned income as it reacts to an increase in the unearned income of his or her spouse.7
The unitary model also predicts that the Slutsky matrix should be symmetric: the compensated
response of the husband’s pre-tax earnings to the net-of-tax rate of the wife is predicted to be equal
to the compensated response of the wife’s pre-tax earnings to the net-of-tax rate of the husband.
I cannot reject Slutsky symmetry at conventional significance levels.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section II discusses the empirical specification. Section III
describes the policy environment and other relevant features of the Swedish economy in the period
under consideration. Section IV describes the data. Section V presents the empirical results and
relates them to a unitary model of family taxpaying decisions. Section VI concludes.
II. Empirical Model
A. Basic Framework
In the framework described in Appendix I, the earnings of a given spouse may depend on his or
her own net-of-tax share and unearned income, and on the net-of-tax share and unearned income
of his or her spouse. For my empirical model, I relate the logs of the variables, which will yield
coefficient estimates interpretable as elasticities and follows the specification in Gruber and Saez
(2002). It is illuminating to follow a specification that has been estimated in previous literature, as
the results under alternative specifications can then be compared in a straightforward way to what
has been estimated in previous work. The log of a spouse’s earned income, ln(Esit), is specified as
a function of the log of that individual’s net-of-tax share (i.e. the log of one minus that individual’s
marginal tax rate), ln(1− τ sit), the log of the other spouse’s net-of-tax share, ln(1− τ
−s
it ), the log of
the individual’s own income, ln(Y sit), and the log of the other spouse’s income, ln(Y
−s
it ). Here the
superscript s ∈ {h, w} represents the individual in question, whereas −s denotes that individual’s
spouse, and h and w refer to the husband and wife, respectively. i indexes couples, and t represents
the time period.
To remove individual-level fixed effects that may be correlated with the tax and income variables
of interest, the model will be estimated in first differences, again following Gruber and Saez (2002):
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where ∆ ln(Zt) represents the change from t− 1 to t in the log of Z. (I use “base year” to indicate
t−1, the initial year in each pair of years over which the first difference is taken, and “final year” to
refer to t, the last year in each pair of years over which the first difference is taken.) The subscript
7More generally, the income pooling condition states that a married individual’s consumption of any good should
react equally to an increase in that individual’s unearned income as it reacts to an increase in the unearned income of
his or her spouse. See Lundberg, Pollak, and Wales (1997) for an alternative test of income pooling in a developed
country.
4
t still appears in the empirical model since multiple first differences will be used. Time dummies
ϑst control for economy-wide earned income growth specific to each period over which the first
difference is taken. εhit and ε
w
it are error terms. X
h
iT and X
w
iT represent other variables–age, age
squared, education, region, number of children, industry, occupation, and sometimes interactions
of the covariates–that control for other factors that could influence changes in earned income.
The control variables bear the subscript T , which refers to an initial period prior to the earliest
observation of t.
The dependent variable, the change in the log of real earned income, may best reflect the welfare
consequences of taxation among the variables commonly observed in tax datasets, as discussed in
Chetty (2009).8 The response of earned income is straightforward to examine because in the data,
the definitions of several types of capital income changed from before the Tax Reform of 1991
to after. In some regressions, I also examine how a measure of taxable labor income, formed by
subtracting a set of deductions from earned income, responds to the net-of-tax share.9 It is worth
noting that in the framework in Appendix I, the relevant independent variable is the net-of-tax
share, rather than the net-of-tax wage.
Since the log of zero is undefined, I add 1 to earnings before logging it, so that the dependent
variable is defined even if an individual does not participate in the labor market. The dependent
variable for spouse s in couple i is therefore ln[(1 + Esit)/(1 + E
s
it−1)], and the notation in (1)
and (2) can be considered shorthand for this expression. The results are generally insensitive to
other choices, such as adding .1 or 10 to earnings before taking the log. In order to address the
concern that logging the dependent variable could have an affect on the results particularly at
low incomes, in one specification, I exclude from the regressions those who exited the labor force.
Because the prediction of Slutsky symmetry of the unitary model of family responses to taxation
(discussed in Appendix I) only holds when both spouses participate in the labor market, I exclude
couples from my main regressions in those pairs of years in which at least one member of the
couple does not participate in the labor market in the base year. The measure of income used as
an independent variable is “virtual income,” which represents the intersection of the individual’s
extended budget segment in consumption-effort space with the Y-axis. The construction of virtual
income is discussed at greater length in Appendix II.10
In the main regressions, I consider two sets of one-year differences, which are pooled in the
regressions: one from 1989-1990, and the other from 1990-1991. These are the years of the tax
reform. This strategy will identify a short-term effect of the changes in the tax schedule.11 The
main source of exogenous variation is that in TR91, marginal tax rates were reduced much more
for those at the top of the income distribution than for those at the bottom. This generates very
large exogenous variation across households and time in the net-of-tax shares of husbands relative
8I also follow the suggestion of Chetty (2009) and explore the response of measures of non-wage compensation
to the tax rate.
9Feldstein (1999) develops a measure of the deadweight loss of taxation in terms of the elasticity of taxable labor
income with respect to the net-of-tax share, but the empirical literature has focused on the elasticity of taxable
income (including capital income) with respect to the net-of-tax share. By investigating the elasticity of taxable
labor income, I estimate a parameter that more closely corresponds to Feldstein’s (1999) model.
10Burtless and Hausman (1978) explain virtual income and why it is the appropriate income measure for estimating
income effects in the presence of a nonlinear budget set.
11Gruber and Saez (2002) find relatively similar elasticities at 1-year, 2-year, and 3-year intervals.
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to their wives. For example, suppose that in Couple 1, the wife is in the lowest tax bracket, and
the husband is in the highest tax bracket (both before and after the reform). In Couple 2, both
the husband and wife are in the highest tax bracket (both before and after the reform). Those in
the highest tax bracket receive a large cut in their marginal tax rate, whereas those in the lowest
bracket receive a small cut. Therefore, due to the tax reform, the net-of-tax share of the husband
relative to that of the wife increases in Couple 1 but stays constant in Couple 2. Thus, I can
effectively relate the changes over time in the relative earnings of the husbands and wives in the
two couples, to the changes over time and couples in their relative net-of-tax shares (and to the
changes in virtual incomes associated with these tax changes and any simultaneous changes in
capital taxation).12
B. Instruments
The actual marginal tax rate that an individual faces is potentially endogenous. For example,
if an individual responds to an increase in his or her own marginal tax rate by decreasing his or
her earned income, and marginal tax rates are progressive, then an OLS estimate of the effect of
the net-of-tax share on earned income will be biased downward. Thus, it is typical to instrument
for the net-of-tax share with a so-called “simulated instrument.” This instrument is constructed
by calculating the change in the net-of-tax share that would have occured if the individual had
maintained the behavior he or she exhibited in the initial period (Gruber and Saez 2002). The
intuitive notion that underlies this procedure is that the change in the tax schedule is exogenous to
individuals’ initial behavior, so the value of this instrument will not be affected by the endogenous
response to the new tax schedule.
In particular, the instrument is constructed by projecting final year taxable income to be base
year taxable income for spouse s in couple i, Zsit−1, multiplied by the growth of mean taxable
income per taxpayer in the sample, (1 + g). Letting Zˆsit be projected taxable income, I set
Zˆsit = (1 + g)Z
s
it−1. Suppose that the net-of-tax share (as a function of taxable income) before
the tax change is given by Tt−1() and the net-of-tax share after the tax change is given by Tt().
I use Tt(Zˆsit) − Tt−1(Z
s
it−1) to instrument for Tt(Z
s
it) − Tt−1(Z
s
it−1). In the regressions relating to
the extensive margin, the average after-tax share is instrumented analogously. Because virtual
income for spouse s in couple i in year t, Y s,vit (), varies according to which budget segment the
individual locates on, it is a function of actual taxable income.13 Thus, virtual income is also
potentially endogenous. I construct a simulated instrument for the actual change in virtual
income, by predicting the change in virtual income that would have occurred, if the individual had
projected taxable income Zˆsit in the final period. In other words, I use Y
s,v
it (Zˆ
s
it)− Y
s,v
it−1(Z
s
it−1) as
an instrument for Y s,vit (Z
s
it)− Y
s,v
it−1(Z
s
it−1).
14
12My regressions in fact allow for more flexibility than a specification that literally related the relative earnings
of the spouses to their relative net-of-tax shares, because I run separate regressions for husbands and wives and
enter each spouse’s net-of-tax share separately in each regression.
13Y
s,v
it () is subscripted by i because it also depends on capital income and government transfers, which vary by
individual.
14Since each spouse’s tax rate on capital income was potentially different prior to the reform (because each
spouse’s capital income was taxed separately), this created an incentive for couples to avoid taxes by allocating
capital income to the lower-taxed spouse. However, this does not affect my estimates because I instrument for
the actual change in virtual income using the change that would have been expected on the basis of the different
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C. Controlling for the Evolution of the Income Distribution
In their regressions relating taxable income to the net-of-tax share and an income effect, Gruber
and Saez (2002) control for a ten-piece spline in the log of base year real income. Since the
size of the tax change is correlated with income, it may be difficult empirically to tease apart
variation in base-year income from variation in the change in marginal tax rates. Indeed, Gruber
and Saez (2002) write that using rich controls for base-year income “may destroy identification.
This problem is especially acute when the size of the tax rate change is directly correlated with
the income level as in the TRA of 1986...In practice, rich controls for base year income make it
very difficult to separately identify income and substitution effects with only one tax change.”
(pp. 11-12). Because I examine only one tax reform, over-controlling for base year income is a
major cause for concern. Given the correlation between base year income and the change in the
marginal tax rate, the regression results may be highly sensitive to mis-specification, for example
of the functional form with which base year income enters.
To address this issue, I calibrate the evolution of the income distribution using a period in which
no major tax change occurs, and I assume that absent the tax change, the income distribution
would have evolved similarly during the period of the change. I then relate the remaining variation
in earned income to exogenous variation in the marginal tax rate, controlling for a rich set of
covariates that can capture effects unique to the period of the tax change. I begin this procedure
by performing the following regression during a period in which the change in the tax schedule is
negligible:
∆ ln(Ewit ) = ξ
w
0
+ f [ln(Ewit−1)]ξ
w
E,w + f [ln(E
h
it−1)]ξ
w
E,h + f [ln(Z
w
it−1)]ξ
w
Z,w
+f [ln(Zhit−1)]ξ
w
Z,h +X
w
iT ξ
w
w +X
h
iT ξ
w
h + υ
w
it (3)
Here f is a ten-piece spline in lagged log real income. I use ten-piece splines in one’s own lagged
log real earned income, one’s spouse’s lagged log real earned income, one’s own lagged log real
taxable income, and one’s spouse’s lagged log real taxable income. I include a ten-piece spline
in lagged log real taxable income because in the main regressions of interest, changes in log real
earned income will be related to changes in marginal tax rates. Marginal tax rates are computed
based on taxable income, so controlling for lagged log real taxable income addresses possible mean
reversion relating to taxable income. The knots of the spline are placed at deciles of the income
distribution. ξhE,h, ξ
h
E,w, ξ
h
Z,h, ξ
h
Z,w, ξ
w
E,w, ξ
w
E,h, ξ
w
Z,w, and ξ
w
Z,h represent vectors of coefficients on
these splines. The analogous regressions are performed for the husband.
These regressions yield an estimated set of coefficients ξˆ
h
E,h, ξˆ
h
E,w, ξˆ
h
Z,h, ξˆ
h
Z,w, ξˆ
w
E,w, ξˆ
w
E,h, ξˆ
w
Z,w, and
ξˆ
w
Z,h, which collectively calibrate how income evolves in the absence of a tax change. In the later
period that spans the tax change, I use these estimated coefficients to partial out the predicted
effect of base year income, thus creating residual changes in the log of real earned income, ∆˜ ln(Ewit )
components of pre-reform virtual income. The estimation procedure therefore effectively throws away any variation
coming from individuals’ endogenous responses to the new tax schedule, and therefore throws away any variation
relating to re-allocation of capital income. It is also worth noting that capital income has been taxed at a flat rate
of 30% since the 1991 reform, thus eliminating any incentive for couples to re-allocate their assets to the lower-taxed
spouse.
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and ∆˜ ln(Ehit), for the wife and the husband:
∆˜ ln(Ewit ) = ∆ ln(E
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Analogous residuals are calculated for husbands. These residuals represent the remaining variation
in the change in earned income, with the predicted effect of lagged income removed. I now modify
equations (1) and (2), relating the residuals to the independent variables:
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The analogous regression is performed for husbands. I instrument for tax rates and virtual incomes
using the simulated instruments described earlier.
The procedure described in this section is conceptually similar to a “triple difference” strategy,
in which the differences across couples over time are contrasted between a period of no policy
change and a period of a policy change. The assumption is that the influence of all of the factors
that are unique to the period spanning the tax change can be removed with the controls. I control
extensively for occupation, industry, region, education, and several other demographic variables.
The evidence is consistent with the contention that this procedure removes the true effect of lagged
income and business cycle effects, since adding more extensive controls makes little difference to
the estimated coefficients of interest.15
D. Implications of the Unitary Model for the Parameter Estimates
Since the empirical model is specified in terms of elasticities, I transform the coefficient estimates
to relate them to the predictions of the unitary model described in Appendix I. For individuals
at the sample means of income, income pooling implies:
βh
3
Y¯ w = βh
4
Y¯ h (6)
and
βw
3
Y¯ h = βw
4
Y¯ w (7)
where bars above the income variables represent their sample mean values.16
To test Slutsky symmetry, begin by recalling the Slutsky relation in the context of earned
income:
∂Eh
∂(1− τw)
|u =
∂Eh
∂(1− τw)
− Ew
∂Eh
∂Y w
(8)
15My procedure also bears a conceptual resemblance to the empirical strategy of Lindsey (1987). Lindsey predicts
how much taxable income should exist in each part of the income distribution, absent the tax change. The difference
between the actual amount of taxable income in each part of the distribution and the predicted amount is then
attributed to the effect of taxation. My procedure performs a similar comparison, but differs from the Lindsey
strategy by employing panel data, rather than repeated cross sections.
16In my tests, I use the sample mean values from 1989, before the tax change. I also test these predictions for
individuals at other points in the income distribution, which yields similar results.
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After performing transformations to express the elasticity estimates as marginal effects, the fol-
lowing equality is implied by Slutsky symmetry, evaluated at the sample means of the variables:
βh
2
E¯h
1− τ¯w
− E¯wβh
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− E¯hβw
4
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III. The Tax Reform of 1991
The Tax Reform of 1991 changed income tax rates dramatically, as the top marginal tax rate
fell from 76% to 51%.17 TR91 revised several other aspects of the tax system, including the VAT
and corporate taxes. The period considered in this paper includes two tax reductions, from 1989-
1990 and 1990-1991, the latter of which was substantially larger. Table 1 shows the tax schedule
for the national Swedish government, called the “state tax schedule," in 1989 and 1991. Marginal
tax rates fell substantially for those at the top of the income distribution but fell little for those
at the bottom. Before TR91, the state tax schedule was comprised of two different schedules, the
basic schedule and the additional schedule. Basic taxable income differed from additional taxable
income because a number of deductions could be taken on the basic schedule that could not be
taken on the additional schedule. The total state marginal tax rate was calculated by summing
the basic marginal tax rate and the additional marginal tax rate. Starting in 1991, the distinction
between basic and additional taxable income was eliminated, and income was taxed according to
a single state tax schedule.
Prior to 1991, Sweden had a global tax system, under which earned income and capital income
were taxed at the same marginal tax rate, calculated on the basis of an individual’s earned income,
taxable government transfers, capital income, and deductions. Starting in 1991, Sweden changed
to a dual tax system, under which the marginal tax rate on earned income is computed only
based on earned income (and taxable government transfers and deductions), and capital income
is taxed at the flat rate of 30%. These changes in the taxation of unearned income provide
sizeable exogenous variation in after-tax unearned income, thus aiding in the identification of
income effects.
The reform also broadened the tax base, to make up for the revenue lost due to the tax cuts.
For example, before 1991, nominal interest expenses were fully deductible against typically high
marginal income tax rates, whereas after the reform, they were deductible against the lower capital
income tax rate of 30%. Due to such broadening of the base, deductions and exclusions fell as
a share of total income. The reform was designed to be almost revenue-neutral. The Swedish
Ministry of Finance (1991) projected that 89.1 billion Swedish Kronor (SEK) would be lost due
17A detailed description and analysis of TR91 can be found in Agell, Englund, and Södersten (1998). Many of
the important features of the reform had been anticipated since 1987, when a commission began to plan the reform
(Agell, Englund and Södersten 1998). Hansson (2007) also examines the Swedish Tax Reform of 1991, focusing on
the response of individuals’ earned income to taxation and assuming that one spouse reacts to the other’s income
as if it were unearned income. Holmlund and Söderstrom (2008) examine reforms following the 1991 reform.
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to the tax cuts, and that SEK 8.2 billion would be lost due to increased spending planned for
1991. However, the projections indicated that SEK 95.1 billion would be recouped through the
combination of base broadening (SEK 79.6 billion), dynamic gains from increased economic activity
in response to the tax cuts (SEK 5.0 billion), and increases in other revenues such as corporate
tax revenues (SEK 10.4 billion).
The total marginal tax rate is calculated as the sum of the local, municipal and state tax
rates. The mean value of the sum of local and municipal rates is 31% (both before and after
the reform), with a minimum of 27% and a maximum of 33% over all the years examined. It is
possible to construct an alternative measure of the marginal tax rate that includes the phase-outs
and phase-ins of the basic deduction and of various transfers (such as a housing-related transfer).
Ultimately, how much individuals respond to such incentives is an empirical question, and the
results are similar when other measures of the marginal tax rate are employed.
Some features of the Swedish macroeconomic environment are shown in Figure 1. The dashed
line represents real percentage GDP growth per capita. Sweden entered a recession in late 1990,
with real per capita GDP growth rates of 1.0%, -1.1%, -1.2%, and -2.0% in 1990, 1991, 1992, and
1993, respectively. The solid line shows the unemployment rate, which increased substantially
during the recession.18 To control for the influence of these macroeconomic factors, I control for
a rich set of covariates, including dummies for 2-digit industry codes, 2-digit occupation codes,
and other covariates interacted with year. Income effects could also have come not only from
changes in capital income measured in the data, but also by the changes in wealth induced by the
macroeconomic environment or by the capitalization of changes in the tax rules into asset prices.
A particular source of concern is that housing prices in Sweden fell substantially around the time of
the reform. When I include a measure of the imputed income from housing wealth in my measure
of virtual income, I estimate similar income effects.
To understand the context in which the tax reform occurred, it is also worth noting various
relevant features of the Swedish environment.19 Completed fertility of the 1961 birth cohort is
2.03. The percentage of the population currently divorced in 2003 was 11.3%. 75.6% of Swedish
women aged 15-64 participated in the labor market in 2002, and male labor force participation
was 79.4%. Swedish GDP per capita in 1990 was $27,240. Finally, a relatively large fraction of
couples in Sweden cohabitate rather than formally marrying, and the percentage married was only
45.2% in 2003. The sample of married Swedes is thus selected in certain ways, but it is a priori
unclear whether and how this should affect the parameter estimates.
IV. The LINDA Data
I use the Longitudinal Individual Dataset for Sweden (LINDA), described in detail in Edin
and Fredriksson (2000). Based on the administrative records of the Swedish government, these
18It is possible to argue that this macroeconomic turmoil could help me to uncover family labor supply responses.
During a period of economic calm, couples may re-optimize their decisions infrequently, but in a period of turmoil,
we may be able to observe these changes more readily and relate them to exogenous changes in tax policy. On the
other hand, one could argue that in a weak labor market, families may not have labor supply choices available to
them that they otherwise would have made. The overall impact on the parameter estimates is a priori unclear.
19The statistics in this paragraph are drawn from Blau, Ferber, and Winkler (2005) and Stevenson and Wolfers
(2007).
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data follow individuals and their families longitudinally. I examine yearly data from 1988 to 1991,
inclusive. The data contain approximately 3.35% of the Swedish population, in addition to family
members of these individuals. A random sample of 20% of the immigrants to Sweden and their
families is also included. The full data consist of approximately 950,000 sampled individuals per
year, comprising approximately 11% of the Swedish population. After weighting by sample weights
to correct for the over-sampling of immigrants, the full sample is cross-sectionally representative
of the married Swedish population in any given year.
Gender, age, region of residence, occupation, industry, number of children, educational attain-
ment, and other covariates are included in the data. In the regressions, the values of all of these
control variables are taken from 1988. Most of these covariates are not available in the U.S.
administrative data on tax returns, including the IRS-Michigan-NBER tax panel. My measure
of earned income includes only wages paid from employers to employees (and excludes goverment
transfers). I construct taxable labor income by subtracting certain deductions from earned in-
come. During the period under consideration, the data do not contain a measure of hours worked.
Further details about the data are contained in Appendix II.
I include in my main sample married individuals who are between 18 and 65 years old (in-
clusive), whose earned income in the base period is greater than zero, and whose spouses share
all of these characteristics. 178,366 individuals fit these criteria, consisting of 89,183 husbands
and the same number of wives. Summary statistics are shown in Table 2. The mean income
in the sample is SEK 174,932 for husbands, as opposed to SEK 103,459 for wives.20 Since men
tend to have higher earnings and marginal tax rates are progressive, the mean net-of-tax share
of husbands (.45) is somewhat lower than that of wives (.57). Since virtual income increases as
the marginal tax rate increases (ceteris paribus), and since men have larger capital income than
women, it makes sense that husbands have substantially higher virtual income on average (SEK
75,477 for husbands, as opposed to SEK 13,863 for wives).
Couples display positive assortative mating. In 1989, their earned incomes have a modest
positive correlation of .22, and the correlation of their net-of-tax shares is .36. Pooling the
changes from 1989 to 1990 and from 1990 to 1991, the correlation between the changes in their
earned incomes is .13, the correlation between the changes in their simulated net-of-tax shares is
.27, and the correlation between the changes in their actual net-of-tax shares is .26. Appendix
Table A1 shows the number of couples who experienced each type of tax change. A cell displays
the number of couples in which the husband and wife received a given combination of simulated
percent changes in their net-of-tax shares. For a given simulated change in one spouse’s net-of-tax
share, there is substantial heterogeneity in the other spouse’s simulated change.
V. Empirical Results
A. Preliminary Evidence
20In 2007 U.S. dollars, these amounts are equivalent to $46,634 in mean earnings for husbands and $27,580 for
wives.
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Figure 2 shows that during the period of the tax reform, larger gains in earned income occurred
in the parts of the income distribution that also experienced larger tax cuts, relative to the period
without the tax reform. I use the evolution of the income distribution from 1988 to 1989 to cali-
brate how the income distribution develops, as described in Section III.C.21 Thus, my regressions
effectively contrast the change in the income distribution from 1988 to 1989, to the changes from
1989 to 1990 and from 1990 to 1991, and relate these relative changes to those in marginal tax
rates, controlling for other factors. Figure 2 graphically depicts these relationships.
On the x-axis of Figure 2 is real earned income in the base year (in SEK divided by 10,000).
The squares represent the mean simulated change in the the log of the net-of-tax share from 1990
to 1991 in each 1990 income group within a 10,000-Kronor range, minus the mean simulated change
in the log of the net-of-tax share from 1988 to 1989 in each 1988 income group.22 The circles show
the mean gain in the log of real earned income in each 1990 earned income group from 1990 to
1991, minus the mean gain in the log of real earned income in each 1988 earned income group from
1988 to 1989. Figure 2a shows the graph for husbands, and Figure 2b shows the graph for wives.23
It is evident that there are much larger gains in log real earned income from 1990 to 1991 at the
top of the income distribution, relative to the bottom of the income distribution, than from 1988
to 1989. For both husbands and wives, the line showing the gain in log real earned income and
the line showing the simulated increase in the log net-of-tax share tend to grow quickly with base
year real earned income until about SEK 170,000, after which both lines level off. It is notable
that it is not simply the case that income growth and tax cuts are both higher at higher income
levels, but also that both level off in the same income range.
In this context, it is worth noting that inequality is only weakly countercyclical in Sweden.
Absent the tax reform, the estimates of Björklund (1991) imply that the deterioration in macroe-
conomic conditions from 1990 to 1991 would have led to a substantially smaller increase in in-
equality than the increase that was actually observed from 1990 to 1991. The available evidence
also shows that inequality does not usually increase more in the first year of a recession than in
subsequent recession years (which is apparent in the work of Kopczuk, Saez, and Song 2007 on the
U.S.). Moreover, the pattern of large relative income gains at the top of the income distribution
from 1990 to 1991 survives when partialing out the effects of characteristics such as industry, oc-
cupation, education, age, and interactions of these variables. This suggests that the large relative
decreases in marginal tax rates at the top of the income distribution help to drive the large increase
in inequality in 1991 relative to the surrounding years.
I anchor the evolution of the income distribution by regressing the change in the log of real
earned income from 1988 to 1989 on a ten-piece spline in own and spousal 1988 log real earned
income and 1988 log real taxable income, as well as control variables. The coefficients on the
21I use the 1988-9 progression of the income distribution, rather than the progression over later years, since
individuals may still have been reacting to the tax changes in the years following the reform.
22The simulated change in the net-of-tax share is not monotonically increasing in base year real earned income
because the brackets before and after the tax change do not occur at exactly the same points in the income
distribution, because the tax base changed from 1990 to 1991, and because the marginal tax rate is based on
taxable income (rather than earned income).
23There are few women in the high income ranges–between SEK 180,000 and SEK 250,000, there are only 306
women on average in each 10,000-Kronor range–so it is unsurprising to find substantial volatility in mean earnings
growth in this range.
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different pieces of the spline are significantly different from each other, indicating that rich controls
for lagged income are warranted. In the main regressions, I instrument for four independent
variables. The first-stage regressions show F-statistics ranging from just over 6,000 to nearly
10,000. The R-squared ranges from .47 to .56. When a given variable is the depedent variable,
its predicted value enters highly significantly, with a coefficient between .8 and .9.
B. Basic Results
Table 3 shows the basic regression results. In columns 1 and 2, I perform regression (5) for the
husband and wife. The controls include age, age squared, number of children below 8, as well as
dummies for nine possible levels of education, 24 Swedish regions, and year. I estimate fairly low
own uncompensated elasticities: .17 for husbands and .25 for wives. The estimates are precise,
with standard errors of .021 and .026, respectively. I find substantial and precisely-estimated own
income elasticities of -.074 for husbands and -.056 for wives, similar to those in Blomquist and
Selin (2007). The negative sign is consistent with the presumption that leisure is a normal good.
Consistent with the typical finding that women’s labor supply is more elastic than men’s, wives’
own uncompensated elasticity is significantly higher than husbands’ (p<.01).
Given these parameter estimates, it is possible to calculate compensated own and cross elastic-
ities, using the Slutsky equation and the transformation from elasticities into effects at the sample
means. These are shown in the bottom section of the table. The compensated own elasticity
is .25 for husbands and .49 for wives (significantly different from each other, and from zero, at
the 1% significance level). Compensated cross elasticities, .048 and .051 for husbands and wives,
respectively, are also substantial. Both are significantly different from zero (p<.05). As one would
expect, these are smaller than the compensated elasticities with respect to one’s own net-of-tax
share. Interestingly, husbands and wives have similar uncompensated cross elasticities and similar
compensated cross elasticities. The uncompensated cross elasticities are not significantly different
from zero at conventional levels. Cross income elasticities, -.0041 for husbands and -.018 for wives,
are also substantial and significantly different from zero (p<.01).
It is theoretically ambiguous whether one’s earnings should rise or fall when the spouse’s tax
rate rises. Parallel with the literature on labor supply, in which the leisure of husbands and
wives could be complementary or substitutable, the "effort" of one spouse (reflected in pre-tax
earnings, as described in Appendix I) could be complementary or substitutable with that of the
other. The results show complementarity: as the net-of-tax share of one’s spouse rises, one’s
own earnings rise. A number of factors could lead to complementarity. If one’s spouse takes
more leisure time, it may be more enjoyable (provide higher marginal utility) to take more leisure
time oneself. Complementarity is also consistent with several forms of social interactions, such as
spouses imitating one another.
Columns 3 and 4 add further controls for the 2-digit occupation and the 2-digit industry of
both the husband and wife, and interactions of all of the control variables with the year dummies.
This controls still further for business cycle factors unique to each year of the tax change. These
regressions show broadly similar estimates, with slightly smaller elasticities. The results are also
similar when I add more interactions of these variables to the regression, such as interactions of
occupation and industry with education, age, or region.
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In Columns 5 and 6, taxable labor income is the dependent variable. The compensated own
elasticity of taxable labor income with respect to the net-of-tax share is .22 for husbands and .35
for wives, and the compensated cross elasticities are .061 and .051, respectively. Interestingly, the
elasticity estimates are similar to those in the regressions in which earned income is the dependent
variable. This may relate to the fact that in Sweden, the deductions available both before and
after the reform may not have been particularly elastic. For example, one of the major deductions
was for costs associated with commuting to work, and these choices are typically found to be
relatively inelastic with respect to price in the short run.
In Appendix Table A2, I take the sample from Table 3, but in order to focus more directly
on the intensive margin, I exclude those individuals in couples in which at least one member does
not participate in the labor market in the final period.24 Since this involves selecting the sample
on the basis of an outcome variable, the results should be interpreted with caution. Because I
exclude labor market non-participants, I can allow the dependent variable to be the residuals of
ln(Est /E
s
t−1) (rather than the residuals of ln[(1 + E
s
t )/(1 + E
s
t−1)], as in Table 3). When either
dependent variable is used, the results are nearly identical. The estimated coefficients are usually
about half as large as the estimated coefficients in the comparable specification in Columns 1 and
2 of Table 3.
My results can be compared with the predictions of the unitary model of family earnings
responses to taxation presented in Appendix I. The unitary model of family decision-making is
defined by the feature that the family’s behavior can be characterized as maximizing a single
utility function. This yields two central predictions.25 First, income pooling: the husband’s
(wife’s) earnings should react equally to a change in his (her) own unearned income as to a change
in his wife’s (her husband’s) unearned income. This condition holds because the family does not
distinguish between the unearned income of the husband and the unearned income of the wife in
making its labor effort and consumption decisions; rather, the household acts as a single agent
that pools its unearned income and reacts to it the same whether its source is the husband or
wife. Second, Slutsky symmetry: The compensated response of the husband’s earnings to the
wife’s net-of-tax rate should be equal to the compensated response of the wife’s earnings to the
husband’s net-of-tax wage. Standard consumer demand theory implies this condition. The family
has a single utility function, so the Slutsky matrix for the consumption of goods, including the
effort of the husband and wife, must be symmetric about the diagonal.
The own income effect for husbands is significantly different from the cross income effect for
husbands (p<.001), and the own income effect for wives is significantly different from the cross
income effect for wives (p<.001). These inequalities represent a violation of the income pooling
prediction of the unitary model presented above, under which own and cross income effects should
be equal. I cannot reject the unitary model’s prediction of Slutsky symmetry–the equality in
equation (10)–at conventional significance levels (p=.19). Income pooling is also violated, and
24The results are similar when I take the sample from Table 3 and instead exclude those individuals who do not
participate in the labor market in the final period.
25Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) present a unitary model in which families trade off consumption and the hours
worked of both the husband and wife. This model includes the two predictions discussed presently and several
other less often tested conditions.
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Slutsky symmetry holds, when I consider the log-log specification in Table 3 and evaluate the
implied effects at values of the independent and dependent variables other than the sample means.
One potential concern is that families who received tax cuts of different magnitudes are sys-
tematically different from one another. Typically, the more a husband’s income exceeds his wife’s,
the larger his tax cut will be relative to hers. If shocks to couples were correlated with how much
husbands earned relative to their wives, then the coefficient estimates could be biased. To address
this concern, I examine couples in which the usual positive correlation between spouses’ relative
incomes and their relative simulated changes in tax rates is reversed. Specifically, I examine
couples in which the spouse that had the larger income prior to the tax cut received the smaller
simulated tax cut. This occurred in 28% of the sample. There were two primary reasons this
occurred. First, as shown in Table 1, there are certain income ranges in which those with higher
incomes received smaller tax cuts. Second, the tax base shifted in TR91, implying that the size of
one’s tax cut depended not only on the size of one’s income, but also on the composition of that
income; those making income from sources that received lighter tax treatment in TR91 tended to
get larger tax cuts. The results for the 28% of couples are very similar to those for the couples
in which the higher-earning spouse received the larger tax cut. When I run the specification
corresponding to Columns 1 and 2 of Table 3 on only the 28% subsample, my estimates are .14,
.024, -.057, -.0038, .23, .019, -.054, and -.013 for the uncompensated own elasticity for husbands,
the uncompensated cross elasticity for husbands, the own income effect for husbands, the cross
income effect for husbands, the uncompensated own elasticity for wives, the uncompensated cross
elasticity for wives, the own income effect for wives, and the cross income effect for wives, respec-
tively. When I run the same regressions on the remaining 72% of couples, the point estimates
are only slightly larger and all statistically indistinguishable from those in the 28% subsample:
.18, .035, -.084, -.0046, .27, .026, -.066, and -.025, respectively. As a second check on the results,
it is also possible to replace each spouse with a "placebo" spouse, who is chosen randomly from
among all other married individuals of the same gender as the real spouse. I then run the same
regressions as in the main regressions, but with the values of the independent variables of the
true spouse replaced with the values for the placebo spouse. As expected, the results show no
significant response to the placebo spouse’s incentives.
Chetty (2009) suggests that the response of measures of non-wage compensation to taxation
should be examined in addition to measures of wage compensation for determining the deadweight
cost of taxation. Measures of non-wage compensation, such as the value of company car benefits,
show no significant response to taxation in my data. This is suggestive of the conclusion that
changes in earned income represent changes in labor supply, either through changes in hours worked
or changes in effort per hour worked that is reflected in the pre-tax wage, rather than changes in
the form of compensation.
C. Comparison with Standard Empirical Specifications
Tables 4-6 show the results of frequently-estimated econometric specifications, which yield quite
different results than those in Table 3. In Columns 1 and 2 of Table 4, I estimate a standard
specification in which married individuals treat their spouses’ income as unearned income. This
specification imposes a restriction–the coefficient on one’s own change in log real virtual income
is restricted to be the same as the coefficient on the change in the log real income of one’s spouse–
and is therefore a priori undesirable. Own uncompensated elasticities are .57 and .78 for husbands
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and wives, respectively. These are much greater than the estimates of .17 and .25 in Columns 1
and 2 of Table 3. The income elasticities, .24 and .19 for husbands and wives, are very large and
of the wrong sign.26 The implied compensated own-elasticities are .46 and .62 for husbands and
wives, respectively, which are also higher than the compensated elasticities in Table 3 (.25 and
.49, respectively). Very similar biases occur in all of the estimates in Table 4 when the dependent
variable is taxable labor income.
If the leisure of husbands and the leisure of wives are complementary, then we would expect
the standard specification to yield income elasticities that are more positive than the true income
elasticities.27 Suppose, for example, that a wife receives a tax cut, leading her earned income to
rise. Under complementarity, the tax cut for this wife also leads her husband to earn more. Thus,
a rise in the husband’s earned income is correlated with a rise in the wife’s earned income. Under
the standard specification, the change in the husband’s earned income contributes to the change
in the measure of the wife’s unearned income. Thus, the wife’s unearned income (which includes
the husband’s income in this specification) tends to rise when the wife’s earned income rises, which
contributes to a positive coefficient on the wife’s unearned income. Given that income elasticities
are overly positive, it also makes sense that uncompensated elasticities are over-estimated. Ceteris
paribus, a rise in the net-of-tax share will decrease virtual income, since the intersection of the
extended budget segment with the y-axis falls when the net-of-tax share rises. In the specification
of Tables 3 and 4, the change in one’s own log net-of-tax share is therefore negatively correlated
with the change in one’s log real virtual income. Yet when spousal income is included along
with own virtual income in the measure of unearned income, as in the standard specification, this
negative correlation is dulled. Thus, in the specification in Columns 1 and 2 of Table 4, the
coefficient on the change in one’s own log net-of-tax share picks up some of the variation that is
actually attributable to the change in one’s log real virtual income.
To explore the factors responsible for these results, Columns 3 and 4 run the traditional spec-
ification, but with own (instrumented) virtual income entered separately from (uninstrumented)
spousal income. This replicates the specification in Columns 1 and 2, but without the restric-
tion imposed that own virtual income is summed with spousal income in calculating the measure
of own unearned income. The coefficient on spousal income is positive and large, whereas the
coefficient on own virtual income is negative and large. This is consistent with the assertion
that the positive correlation between the change in spousal income and the change in one’s own
income induces overly positive income effects in Columns 1 and 2. I reject the hypothesis that
the coefficient on own virtual income is the same as the coefficient on spousal income (p<.001).28
Uncompensated own elasticities and the coefficients on own log virtual income are similar to those
in the specification in Table 3. As argued above, it appears that the own uncompensated elasticity
is over-estimated in Columns 1 and 2 because when spousal income is included along with own
26In principle, it is possible that leisure is an inferior good, which would be consistent with the positive coefficient
on the change in log real unearned income. However, it appears implausible that leisure would be so strongly
inferior, and the coefficient restriction associated with this specification makes it independently undesirable.
27In the presence of substitutable spousal leisure, the estimated income elasticities should be overly negative.
Here I use "leisure" as shorthand to describe the absence of "effort" (as reflected in pre-tax earnings in the model
in Appendix I).
28I also reject the hypothesis that these coefficients are equal when I run a specification in which each of these
variables enters the regression linearly (rather than the logarithmic specification in Table 6).
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virtual income in the measure of unearned income, the own uncompensated elasticity term picks
up variation actually attributable to own virtual income.
To shed more light on the factors driving the results and evaluate to what extent other common
specifications may be biased, Table 5 shows the results of omitting various key right-hand-side
variables. Columns 1 and 2 omit spouse income and show that the coefficient on own NTS and own
income are nearly unchanged. As expected due to the strong negative correlation of spouse virtual
income and spouse NTS, the coefficient on spouse NTS is much more positive than in the Table 3
specification. Columns 3 and 4 omit the spouse terms entirely from the regressions. Interestingly,
this makes little difference to the estimates of the own elasticities, presumably due to the relatively
low correlation between changes in spouse tax rates shown in Appendix Table 1. Columns 5 and
6 include only own and spouse NTS as independent variables of interest. As expected due to the
negative correlation of virtual income and NTS, the coefficients are substantially larger than in
Table 3. The own NTS coefficients are smaller than in Table 4 Columns 1 and 2, presumably
because the income effect was so over-estimated in the Table 4 specification. Columns 7 and 8
estimate the results with only own NTS as an independent variable, a familiar specification from
much of the literature. As before, I find little difference in the elasticities from the specification
in Columns 5 and 6 that also includes spouse NTS. Evidently ignoring the spouse in an empirical
specification makes little difference, but constraining responses to own and spouse variables makes
a large difference.
Table 6 investigates specifications often employed in the literature on the elasticity of taxable
income. In particular, in this literature it is common to include a measure of overall family income
as an independent variable (e.g. Gruber and Saez 2002), disallowing the possibility of separate
effects of each spouse’s income on earnings. In Columns 1 and 2, I investigate the consequences
of this specification. The change in log family virtual income is the change in the log of husband
virtual income plus wife virtual income, and this is instrumented using the predicted change. The
own elasticities are much larger than in the basic specification, whereas the reaction to the spouse’s
net-of-tax share (NTS) is negative rather than positive. It makes sense that the uncompensated
own NTS elasticity is over-estimated: the own NTS is negatively correlated with own virtual
income, and the estimate of the effect of virtual income is less negative in this specification than
the estimated effect of own virtual income in Table 3. The coefficient on own NTS therefore picks
up some of the variation that is picked up by own virtual income in Table 3. Likewise, it makes
sense that the effect of the spouse’s NTS is overly negative: the effect of spouse’s income is now
estimated to be more negative than in Table 3 (since spouse’s income and own income are lumped
together), and since spouse’s virtual income is highly negatively correlated with spouse’s NTS, the
coefficient on the latter is now more negative than in the Table 3 specification.
In the U.S., we typically have information on the sum of spouses’ earnings, which is then related
to the family’s marginal tax rate and income. In the Swedish context, spouses have different
marginal tax rates; because the family lacks one marginal tax rate, it does not make sense to
relate overall family income to the family’s marginal tax rate. To address this issue, it is possible
to investigate the results in Sweden when the simulated changes in each spouse’s marginal labor
income tax rate are equal, as in the U.S. context. In Columns 3-5 of Table 6, I regress earnings
on husband’s net-of-tax share, husband income, and wife income, using husband’s earnings, wife’s
earnings, and the sum of husband’s and wife’s earnings as the dependent variables. As expected,
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when the sum of husband and wife income is the dependent variable, the elasticity with respect to
each independent variable is the sum of the elasticities for husbands and wives separately. The
regressions with husband’s and wife’s income as the separate dependent variables are informative
because they allow us to disaggregate the overall elasticity into the separate contributing parts.
When I regress earnings on the change in the NTS and the change in family income in Columns
6-8, I estimate similar uncompensated elasticities but a substantially higher income elasticity than
in Columns 3-5. The higher income elasticity makes sense, since I sum together husband and wife
income before taking the log; if smaller percentage changes in virtual income are associated with
similar percentage changes in family earned income, the elasticity of family earned income with
respect to virtual income is accordingly higher.
VI. Conclusions
This paper looks inside the family to uncover rich aspects of spouses’ earnings responses to
taxation. I argue that this may lead to new conclusions about the effects of labor income taxation
that were obscured in earlier analyses that estimated more simplified econometric models. The
results reveal that individuals respond substantially to their spouses’ incentives, with sizeable
compensated cross elasticities and cross income effects. It is noteworthy that the compensated
earnings elasticity of married women is higher than that of married men, even in Sweden, which
is often noted for its gender equality and high female labor force participation rate (see Alesina,
Ichino, and Karabarbounis 2009). A customary specification, which treats spousal income as
unearned income, produces income effects that are wrong-signed and large, and considerable bias
results in the estimates of the uncompensated and compensated own elasticities. Likewise, a
specification that assumes that individuals respond to overall family taxable income—precluding the
possibility that the response to each spouse’s unearned income is different—may lead to substantial
biases. Relatedly, specifications that relate overall family earnings to the family’s tax rate obscure
the separate contribution of each spouse’s earnings decision to overall family earnings.
While it has been recognized that these simplified specifications are not fully justified, it has
not been recognized that these simplifications may lead to substantial biases in parameter esti-
mates. The reasons for these substantial differences, relating to the simplifications inherent in
the customary specifications, stand independent of features of the particular Swedish context in
which I estimate the results. The more general lesson, applicable outside of the Swedish context,
is that standard specifications simplify a richer family decision and may therefore lead us astray.
The results suggest that at the least, we should place a high premium on gathering data in other
contexts on the separate earnings of each spouse, and relating each spouse’s earnings separately
to measures of both spouses’ incentives (including separate measures of the virtual income of each
spouse).
These results have implications for models of family taxation. At a basic level, the paper
uncovers a reaction to spousal incentives, suggesting that treating individuals without considering
the incentives of their spouses may be an unwarranted simplification. The unitary model of family
labor income responses to taxation is rejected by the income pooling test, with own income effects
much larger than cross income effects, but I cannot reject Slutsky symmetry. Taken together,
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these results suggest that family models in which income pooling is violated by a large margin, but
Slutsky symmetry almost holds—such as when bargaining power depends on the family distribution
of income but not on the tax rate (Bourguignon, Chiappori, and Lechene 2004)—should be explored
further. Feldstein (1999) derives a measure of the deadweight cost of taxing labor income under
the assumption of a unitary decision-maker. Likewise, the literature on the optimal taxation of
the family has typically assumed a unitary decision-maker (Boskin and Sheshinski 1983; Kleven,
Kreiner, and Saez 2009; Kaplow 2008). Further work on taxpaying decisions by non-unitary
families would be valuable.
The results are also noteworthy insofar as they may reflect an impact of taxation on labor
supply. Earned income is sometimes thought to reflect a broader measure of labor supply than
hours worked does (Feldstein 1995, 1999). For example, effort per hour worked should influence
earned income by increasing the marginal product and thus the hourly wage. Measures of hours
worked are also subject to substantial measurement error. While earned income will also reflect
changes in the form of compensation–for example, taxation might affect the mix of compensation
between fringe benefits and wage compensation–it is not clear whether earned income or hours
worked is a "better" measure of labor supply overall, since earned income has two major advantages
over hours worked. The results also show no response of non-wage compensation to the independent
variables. To the extent that these results reflect changes in labor supply, they are important in
relating to a long line of literature on family labor supply (e.g. Ashenfelter and Heckman 1974;
Devereux 2004; Blau and Kahn 2007). This literature has often been limited by the difficulty of
finding exogenous variation in the incentives of the spouse. Interpreted as labor supply responses,
the estimates suggest that the leisure of one spouse is complementary with the leisure of another
(e.g. Hunt 1998; Gustman and Steinmeier 2000). Indeed, it is possible to argue that compensated
changes in the tax rate of one spouse are unlikely to cause a shift in the form of compensation
of the other spouse, so that the effect on the spouse’s earned income should reflect a change in
the spouse’s labor effort (not simply a change in the form of compensation). In this context, the
results suggest that the customary labor supply specification, in which labor supply is related to
wages or the net-of-tax wage, and one spouse’s income is treated as the unearned income of the
other spouse, can produce substantially biased estimates.
The ability to examine the effects of separate changes in each spouse’s marginal tax rate has
allowed me to go beyond the limitations of standard specifications. The difference in the resulting
estimates is large, and the implications for understanding responses to labor income taxation could
be far-reaching. Several European countries have individual taxation and have made available
administrative micro-data on the income of each spouse. This suggests the possibility of future
work in such contexts, which could add to the new picture of family earnings decisions emerging
from this paper.
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Appendix I. Predictions of a Unitary Model in the Context of Earned Income
The typical unitary model relates the net-of-tax wages of married couples to their hours worked,
considering a trade-off between hours worked and the after-tax level of consumption. In this section, I
consider a model that relates the net-of-tax share to pre-tax earnings, considering a trade-off between effort
that is reflected in pre-tax earnings and the after-tax consumption that is bought with these earnings.
In this framework, pre-tax earned income is taken to reflect effort. The Slutsky symmetry condition
will still hold in the context of earned income: The first spouse’s compensated response of earnings to
the second spouse’s net-of-tax share is equal to the second spouse’s compensated response of earnings to
the first spouse’s net-of-tax share. This can be seen through the following reasoning. In the standard
unitary framework, a family maximizes
U(C, Lh, Lw) (11)
s.t. C = wh(1− τh)(T h − Lh) + ww(1− τw)(Tw − Lw) + Y (12)
or
max U(whHh + wwHw + Y,Hh, Hw) (13)
over Hh and Hw, where Hh = T h − Lh, Hw = Tw − Lw, and Y = Y h + Y w.
In the context of earned income, this family maximizes
U((1− τh)Eh + (1− τw)Ew + Y,Eh, Ew) (14)
over Eh and Ew, where Eh and Ew represent the pre-tax earned income of the husband and the wife.
(The variable E has been chosen to suggest not only earned income, but also to emphasize that pre-tax
earned income is a composite measure of effort.) We can interpret U in this context as defined over
consumption (1− τh)Eh + (1− τw)Ew + Y , and the effort of each spouse Eh and Ew.
It is clear that maximization of (14) over Eh and Ew is entirely analogous to maximization of (13)
overHh andHw, and that both will yield Slutsky matrices that are symmetric, negative semidefinite, and
homogenous of degree zero. This is because the Slutsky matrix is guaranteed to be symmetric as long as
the utility function U represents a continuous, locally nonsatiated and strictly convex preference relation
defined on any consumption set, and the Hicksian demand function is continuously differentiable (Mas-
Collel, Whinston, and Green, Proposition 3.G.2). These assumptions can be made over any consumption
set (including a consumption set that includes pre-tax earned income) and should hold at least as plausibly
in the context of earned income as in the context of hours worked (when both spouses participate in the
labor market, precluding corner solutions).
The utility function U((1−τh)Eh+(1−τw)Ew+Y h+Y w, Eh, Ew) treats Y h and Y w symmetrically.
It is therefore clear that when we solve for ∂Eh/∂Y h, ∂Eh/∂Y w, ∂Ew/∂Y h, and ∂Ew/∂Y w using the
first order conditions and the implicit function theorem, we must have ∂Eh/∂Y h = ∂Eh/∂Y w and
∂Ew/∂Y h = ∂Ew/∂Y w.
Appendix II. Additional Data Description
Education dummies are dummies for nine categories measuring highest school attainment. Industry
and occupation are defined at the 2-digit level. Occasional missing values of these covariates are rep-
resented by dummies indicating missing values. For the vast majority of households considered in the
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regressions, both spouses’ earnings are positive in both base periods (i.e. both 1989 and 1990). However,
a number of households have positive earnings for both household members in the base period in one
of these years but not in the other. Observations for these individuals are included in the regressions
only when the income of both household members is positive in the base year; otherwise, the dependent
variable is a missing value. 178,366 individuals are in households in which both spouses have positive
earnings in at least one of the years examined.
In 1991, Sweden switched from a global tax system, under which the marginal tax rate on earned
income depends on the sum of earned income, capital income, and taxable government transfers (minus
deductions), to a dual tax system, under which the marginal tax rate on earned income is computed only
based on earned income (and deductions and taxable government transfers), and capital income is taxed
at a flat rate. This implies that the proper way to calculate virtual income is different in 1991 than it was
before 1991. Prior to 1991, virtual income is calculated by computing the intersection of the individual’s
extended budget segment with the y-axis in taxable income-consumption space, and adding the value of
untaxed transfers. Predicted virtual income in 1990 is calculated by inflating the value of taxable income
in 1990 by the mean per-person growth in taxable income of individuals in the sample, calculating the
virtual income associated with this predicted budget segment, and adding this amount to the predicted
value of untaxed transfers (calculated by inflating 1989 untaxed transfers by the mean per-person growth
in untaxed transfers from 1989 to 1990 of individuals in the sample).
In 1991, virtual income is computed by adding three quantities: the intersection with the y-axis of the
individual’s extended budget segment in pre-tax taxable labor income-consumption space, the after-tax
value of capital income, and the value of untaxed government transfers. (Here taxable labor income
is taken to include government transfers.) Because of the change in the tax base, in constructing the
instrument for the marginal tax rate for 1991, I project 1991 taxable labor income by multiplying each
individual’s 1990 taxable labor income by the mean per-individual growth in taxable labor income of
individuals in the sample from 1990 to 1991. I calculate predicted virtual income in 1991 by determining
what virtual income would have been in 1991 if an individual had the projected taxable labor income
in 1991, as well as the projected values of capital income and untaxed transfers (calculated by inflating
the values of capital income and untaxed transfers from 1990 by the mean growth from 1990 to 1991 in
the per capita values of these variables of individuals in the sample). Like all income variables, virtual
income is always represented in real terms.
When it enters as a dependent variable in my regressions, I construct taxable labor income by sub-
tracting deductions from earned income. The deductions in question do not include deductions for
interest payments or capital losses. To form a consistent measure of deductions, I exclude those that
were available only before or only after 1991. When I subtract deductions from earned income, the result
is occasionally negative. (Because the sample excludes labor market non-participants, earned income
minus deductions is negative for only .28% of the sample.) Since I examine the change in the log of real
taxable labor income, and the log of zero or of a negative number is undefined, I set the values of real
taxable labor income equal to 1 for these individuals in the years in which it is negative. The results are
insensitive to this choice. Before 1991, certain deductions could be claimed only against the basic tax
schedule. However, all of the deductions included in my measure of deductions prior to 1991 could be
claimed against both the basic schedule and against the additional schedule. Thus, their marginal tax
price was equal to the net-of-tax share associated with earned income, so a specification that relates my
measure of taxable labor income to this net-of-tax share is appropriate.
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Figure 1. Macroeconomic Variables in Sweden, 1975-2000
Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Foreign Labor Statistics. The dashed line shows the yearly growth
rate of real GDP per capita in Sweden in each year from 1975 to 2000. The solid line shows the unemployment
rate in Sweden in each year.
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Figure 2a. Changes in Earnings and Changes in Net-of-Tax Shares of Husbands, by Base Year Income
Group
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Notes: The figure shows that larger gains in real earned income took place in the same parts of the income
distribution that experienced larger cuts in marginal tax rates, and that both rise until approximately the same
point in the income distribution, at which point both lines level off. On the x-axis is real earned income (in Swedish
Kronor) in the base year, divided by 10,000. The squares represent the mean simulated change in the log of the
net-of-tax share (NTS) from 1990 to 1991 in each base-year income group (within a 10,000-Kronor range), minus
the mean simulated change in the log of the net-of-tax share from 1988 to 1989 in each base-year income group.
The mean simulated change in the log of the net-of-tax share is not monotonically increasing in base year real
earned income because the brackets before and after the tax change do not occur at exactly the same points in the
income distribution, because the tax base changed from 1990 to 1991, and because the marginal tax rate is based
on taxable income (not earned income). The circles show the mean gain in the log of real earned income from 1990
to 1991 in each base year earned income group, minus the mean gain in the log of real earned income from 1988 to
1989 in each base year earned income group.
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Figure 2b. Changes in Earnings and Changes in Net-of-Tax Shares of Wives, by Base Year Income
Group
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Notes: The figure shows that larger gains in real earned income took place in the same parts of the income
distribution that experienced larger cuts in marginal tax rates, and that both rise until approximately the same
point in the income distribution, at which point both lines level off. On the x-axis is real earned income (in Swedish
Kronor (SEK)) in the base year, divided by 10,000. The squares represent the mean simulated change in the log of
the net-of-tax share (NTS) from 1990 to 1991 in each base-year income group (within a 10,000-SEK range), minus
the mean simulated change in the log of the net-of-tax share from 1988 to 1989 in each base-year income group.
The mean simulated change in the log of the net-of-tax share is not monotonically increasing in base year real
earned income because the brackets before and after the tax change do not occur at exactly the same points in the
income distribution, because the tax base changed from 1990 to 1991, and because the marginal tax rate is based
on taxable income (not earned income). The circles show the mean gain in the log of real earned income from 1990
to 1991 in each base year earned income group, minus the mean gain in the log of real earned income from 1988
to 1989 in each base year earned income group. It is unsurprising that in the higher income ranges, wives’ mean
income gains exhibit substantial volatility, since between SEK 180,000 and SEK 250,000, on average there are only
306 women in each 10,000-Kronor range.
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Table 1. Marginal Tax Rates by Income and Year
1989 Schedule 1991 Schedule
Bracket Start Bracket End MTR Bracket Start Bracket End MTR
0 70,000 .36 0 149,284 .31
70,000 140,000 .51 149,284 – .51
140,000 190,000 .65
190,000 – .76
Source: Statistics Sweden. “MTR” refers to the marginal tax rate. The marginal tax rate is calculated by
summing the Swedish state marginal tax rate with the average sum of local and municipal marginal tax rates (31%
both before and after the reform). All amounts shown in the table are in real 1989 Swedish Kronor (SEK). In
nominal terms, the end of the first bracket in 1991 was SEK 180,300. In 1989, an individual’s tax liability was the
sum of his or her liabilities on two different tax schedules, the basic tax schedule and the additional tax schedule.
"Additional taxable income" refers to the measure of taxable income on the basis of which the liability on the
additional tax schedule was calculated; "basic taxable income" refers to the measure of taxable income on the basis
of which the liability on the basic tax schedule was calculated. Additional taxable income differed from basic
taxable income because one could claim more deductions on the basic schedule than on the additional schedule.
The additional schedule applied to individuals whose additional taxable income was above SEK 140,000. The tax
schedule shown above for 1989 assumes that basic taxable income is equal to additional taxable income. The tax
base also shifted in a number of ways from 1989 to 1991. For example, before 1991, the marginal tax rate on earned
income was calculated as a function of both capital and labor income, whereas starting in 1991, capital income
became irrelevant to the calculation of the marginal tax rate on earned income. “–” indicates that the bracket
continues at all higher levels of income.
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Table 2. Summary Statistics
Husbands Wives
Mean SD Mean SD
Earnings 174,932 84,644 103,459 49,778
Taxable Labor Income 155,283 77,684 93,831 46,267
Age 44.0 9.16 41.29 9.11
Children < 18 1.40 1.18 1.40 1.18
Net-of-Tax Share .45 .10 .57 .088
Virtual Income 75,477 20,092 13,863 13,561
Source: LINDA data. The sample contains 178,366 individuals, of whom 89,183 are husbands and 89,183 are
wives. The sample includes only married Swedes who are not self-employed, do not hold shares in a closely held
corporation, are between 18 and 65 years old (inclusive), whose earnings are greater than zero in 1989 or 1990, and
whose spouses share these characteristics. The values of the variables are from 1988 and are expressed in 1988
SEK. The net-of-tax share is defined as one minus the marginal tax rate. Taxable labor income is calculated by
subtracting certain deductions from earned income, as described in Appendix II.
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Table 3. IV Regressions of the Change in Log Real Earnings or Log Real Taxable Labor Income on
the Change in both Spouses’ Log Net-of-Tax Shares and Log Real Virtual Incomes
Earned Inc. Taxable Labor Inc.
(1) H (2) W (3) H (4) W (5) H (6) W
∆Own .17 .25 .15 .22 .17 .19
NTS (.021)*** (.026)*** (.021)*** (.025)*** (.022)*** (.026)***
∆Spouse .031 .023 .026 .024 .046 .042
NTS (.028) (.022) (.027) (.020) (.028) (.022)***
∆Own -.074 -.056 -.055 -.043 -.052 -.046
Income (.0055)*** (.0027)*** (.0051)*** (.0022)*** (.0050)*** (.0024)***
∆Spouse -.0041 -.018 -.00072 -.013 -.0038 -.016
Income (.0022)** (.0044)*** (.0019) (.0040)*** (.0020)* (.0024)***
Add’l. Controls? No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 89,183 89,183 89,183 89,183 89,183 89,183
Compensated .25 .49 .21 .38 .22 .37
Own Elasticity (.020)*** (.024)*** (.020)*** (.023)*** (.029)*** (.038)***
Compensated .048 .051 .037 .040 .061 .057
Cross Elasticity (.023)** (.021)** (.021)* (.019)** (.030)** (.029)***
Notes: The dependent variable in Columns 1-4 is the residuals of ln[(1+Et)/(1+Et−1)]. E is earned income.
The residuals are calculated by partialing out the predicted effect of lagged income, as described in the text. “∆Own
NTS” is ln[(1-MTRt)/(1-MTRt−1)], where MTR is one’s own marginal tax rate. “∆Own Income” is ln[(1+VIt)/(1+
VIt−1)], where VI is one’s own virtual income. “∆Spouse NTS” and “∆Spouse Income” are the analogs. The
sample includes married Swedes who are not self-employed, do not hold shares in a closely held corporation, are
between 18 and 65 years old (inclusive), whose earnings are positive in 1989 or 1990, and whose spouses share these
characteristics. The years examined are 1989-90 and 1990-91. All regressions control for year dummies and the
1988 values of age, age squared, number of children, and dummies for education level and region. “Add’l. Controls”
means that 2-digit industry and occupation dummies for both spouses and interactions of all of the controls with
year dummies are included. “H” and "W" denote regressions for husbands and wives, respectively. “N” is the total
number of individuals in the regressions. In Columns 5 and 6, the dependent variable is the residuals of taxable
labor income. Standard errors clustered by individual are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 4. Comparison with Other Specifications: IV Regressions of Husbands’ and Wives’ Change
in Log Real Earnings on the Instrumented Change in Own Log Net-of-Tax Share and the Instrumented
Change in a measure of Log Real Unearned Income or the Instrumented Change in Spouse’s Log Net-of-
Tax Share
(1) H (2) W (3) H (4) W
∆Own NTS .57 .78 .17 .24
(.021)*** (.026)*** (.021)*** (.026)***
∆Virtual Inc. .24 .19
+∆Spouse Inc. (.012)*** (.010)***
∆Spouse NTS
∆Virtual Inc. -.073 -.057
(.0051)*** (.0023)***
∆Spouse Inc. .11 .12
(.0055)*** (.0056)***
N 89,183 89,183 89,183 89,183
Notes: The dependent variable is the residuals of ln[(1+Et)/(1+Et−1)], where E denotes earnings and the
subscript denotes the year. The residuals are calculated by partialing out the predicted effect of lagged income
on the true value of ln[(1+Et)/(1+Et−1)], using the 1988-9 evolution of the income distribution to determine
the coefficients, as described in the text. “∆Own NTS” is ln[(1-MTRt)/(1-MTRt−1)], where MTR refers to
one’s own marginal tax rate and the subscript refers to the year; “∆Spouse NTS” is the analog. “∆Virtual
Inc.+∆Spouse Inc.” refers to ln[(1+(VI+SI)t)/(1+(VI+SI)t−1)], where VI is the individual’s own virtual income
and the subscript refers to the year, and SI is actual spousal income in the year in question. “∆Virtual Inc.” refers
to ln[(1+VIt)/(1+VIt−1)], and "∆Spouse Inc." is defined similarly. The sample includes only married Swedes who
are not self-employed, do not hold shares in a closely held corporation, are between 18 and 65 years old (inclusive),
whose earnings are greater than zero in 1989 or 1990, and whose spouses share these characteristics. The years
included in the regressions are 1989-1990 and 1990-1991, when the tax changes occurred. These years are pooled
in the regressions. All regressions control for year dummies and the 1988 values of age, age squared, number of
children, dummies for nine education levels, and dummies for 24 regions. “H” refers to regressions for husbands,
and “W” refers to regressions for wives. “N” refers to the total number of individuals included in the regressions,
the vast majority of whom appear in both 1989-1990 and 1990-1991. Standard errors clustered by individual are
in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 5. Comparison with Other Specifications: IV Regressions of Husbands’ and Wives’ Change in
Log Real Earnings on the Instrumented Change in Own Log Net-of-Tax Share, the Instrumented Change
in Spouse’s Log Net-of-Tax Share, and/or the Instrumented Change in Log Real Own Unearned Income
(1) H (2) W (3) H (4) W (5) H (6) W (7) H (8) W
∆Own .17 .24 .18 .25 .42 .71 .42 .71
NTS (.02)*** (.03)*** (.02)*** (.03)*** (.02)*** (.03)*** (.02)*** (.03)***
∆Spouse .064 .081 .075 .082
NTS (.03)*** (.02)*** (.03)*** (.02)***
N 89,183 89,183 89,183 89,183 89,183 89,183 89,183 89,183
Notes: The dependent variable is the residuals of ln[(1+Et)/(1+Et−1)]. E is earned income. The residuals
are calculated by partialing out the predicted effect of lagged income, as described in the text. “∆Own NTS”
is ln[(1-MTRt)/(1-MTRt−1)], where MTR is one’s own marginal tax rate. “∆Own Income” is ln[(1+VIt)/(1+
VIt−1)], where VI is one’s own virtual income. “∆Spouse NTS” and “∆Spouse Income” are the analogs. The
sample includes married Swedes who are not self-employed, do not hold shares in a closely held corporation, are
between 18 and 65 years old (inclusive), whose earnings are positive in 1989 or 1990, and whose spouses share these
characteristics. The years examined are 1989-90 and 1990-91. All regressions control for year dummies and the
1988 values of age, age squared, number of children, and dummies for education level and region. “H” and "W"
denote regressions for husbands and wives, respectively. “N” is the total number of individuals in the regressions.
Standard errors clustered by individual are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and
10% levels, respectively.
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Table 6. Comparison with Other Specifications: IV Regressions of Husbands’ or Wives’ Change in Log
Real Earnings, or the Sum of Changes in Husbands’ or Wives’ in Log Real Earnings, on the Instrumented
Change in Spouses’ or Family Log Net-of-Tax Share, the Instrumented Change in Husband Log Real
Unearned Income, the Instrumented Change in Wife Log Real Unearned Income, or the Instrumented
Change in Log Real Family Unearned Income
(1) H (2) W (3) H (4) W (5) Sum (6) H (7) W (8) Sum
∆Own .30 .59
NTS (.022)*** (.027)***
∆Spouse -.015 -.054
NTS (.026) (.020***
∆Family .25 .11 .36 .24 .12 .36
NTS (.07)*** (.06)** (.10)*** (.07)*** (.06)** (.10)***
∆Husb -.08 -.04 -.12
Income (.02)*** (.01)*** (.02)***
∆Wife -.02 -.05 -.07
Income (.02) (.01)*** (.02)***
∆Fam. -.054 -.066 -.10 -.09 -.19
Income (.0065)*** (.0057)*** (.01)*** (.01)*** (.01)***
N 89,183 89,183 23,759 23,759 23,759 23,759 23,759 23,759
Notes: “H” and "W" denote regressions for husbands and wives, respectively, in which the dependent variable
is the residuals of ln[(1+Et)/(1+Et−1)], where E denotes the unearned income of husbands or wives, respectively.
In the columns labeled "Sum," the dependent variable is the change in the sum of the residuals of the log earned
income of the husband and wife summed. Columns 1 and 2 are based on the full sample, and Columns 3-8 limit
the sample to those observations in which have the same simulated changes in their NTS, which I call “∆Family
NTS.” The residuals are calculated by partialing out the predicted effect of lagged income, as described in the
text. “∆Husb NTS” is ln[(1-MTRt)/(1-MTRt−1)], where MTR is one’s own marginal tax rate. “∆Husb Income”
is ln[(1+VIt)/(1+ VIt−1)], where VI is one’s own virtual income. “∆Wife NTS” and “∆Wife Income” are the
analogs. “∆Family Income” refers to ln[(VIht+VIwt)/(VIht−1+VIwt−1)], where VI refers to virtual income. The
sample includes married Swedes who are not self-employed, do not hold shares in a closely held corporation, are
between 18 and 65 years old (inclusive), whose earnings are positive in 1989 or 1990, and whose spouses share these
characteristics. The years examined are 1989-90 and 1990-91. All regressions control for year dummies and the
1988 values of age, age squared, number of children, and dummies for education level and region. “N” is the total
number of individuals in the regressions. Standard errors clustered by individual are in parentheses. ***, **, and
* indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Appendix Table A1. Number of Spouses with each Possible Combination of Simulated Percent
Changes in Net-of-Tax Shares
Changes for Wives
Changes
for
Husbands
-23 -6 -2 8 26 29 33 38 77 81 82 156
-23 0 2 1 71 1 8 34 0 0 0 0 0
-6 0 89 0 906 0 199 1,470 0 0 28 9 3
-2 1 2 10 245 1 13 164 0 0 3 3 2
8 5 58 18 4,582 1 256 2,182 3 1 56 10 12
26 0 0 4 61 2 7 33 0 0 4 1 1
29 1 5 17 9,553 0 3,107 17,221 0 0 428 193 28
33 2 249 2 9,066 1 1,508 13,592 1 0 213 84 23
38 0 0 0 13 1 0 8 2 0 0 0 0
77 0 1 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
81 0 502 7 5,500 3 2,873 10,064 1 1 1,047 359 115
82 0 2 0 205 0 33 332 0 0 18 57 4
156 0 20 0 36 0 8 45 0 0 6 15 32
Notes: The number in each cell represents the number of couples in the sample in which the husband and wife
had a given combination of simulated percent changes in their net-of-tax shares from 1989 to 1991. The heading
of each column shows the simulated percent change in wives’ net-of-tax share; the heading of each row shows the
simulated percent change in husbands’ net-of-tax share. The simulated percent change in the net-of-tax share is
calculated as the percent change in the net-of-tax share that an individual would have experienced from 1989 to
1991 if his or her income had grown at the economy-wide growth rate of per-person income. The table shows 87,649
observations, which is 1,534 observations smaller than the sample size in the regressions in Table 3 (89,183). This
is because some additional individuals enter the sample in 1990, because both of the members of their household
have positive earnings in 1990, but not in 1989. There are 12 possible percentage changes in the net-of-tax share
because in 1989, the total marginal tax rate was the sum of the marginal tax rate on the basic schedule and the
marginal tax rate on the additional schedule, and two individuals with the same marginal tax rate on one of these
schedules could have a different marginal tax rates on the other schedule. For simplicity, I have assumed that
everyone faces the same total local and municipal tax rate of 31% (which is the mean sum of these tax rates both
before and after the reform).
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Appendix Table A2. Alternative Specification: IV Regressions of the Change in Log Real Earnings
on the Instrumented Change in both Spouses’ Net-of-Tax Shares and the Instrumented Change in both
Spouses’ Real Virtual Incomes
(1) H (2) W
∆Own .10 .13
NTS (.011)*** (.014)***
∆Spouse .016 .018
NTS (.015) (.012)
∆Own -.041 -.029
Income (.0030)*** (.0014)***
∆Spouse .00030 -.0097
Income (.0011) (.0024)***
N 86,276 86,276
Notes: I include only observations on individuals in couples in which both members have positive earnings in
both the base year and the final year. Since couples are selected on the basis of an outcome variable, the results
should be interpreted with caution. The dependent variable is the residuals of ln(Et/Et−1), where E is earned
income. The residuals are calculated by partialing out the predicted effect of lagged income from ln(Et/Et−1), as
described in the text. "∆Own NTS” is ln[(1-MTRt)/(1-MTRt−1)], where MTR is one’s own marginal tax rate,
and “∆Own Income” refers to ln[(1+VIt)/(1+ VIt−1)], where VI is one’s own virtual income. “∆Spouse NTS”
and “∆Spouse Income” are the analogs. The sample includes only married Swedes who are not self-employed, do
not hold shares in a closely held corporation, are between 18 and 65 years old (inclusive), and whose spouses share
these characteristics. The years examined are 1989-90 and 1990-91. All regressions control for year dummies and
the 1988 values of age, age squared, number of children, dummies for nine education levels, and dummies for 24
regions. "H” refers to regressions for husbands, and “W” to those for wives. “N” is the total number of individuals
included in the regressions. Standard errors clustered by individual are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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